Introduction
Since ancient times,philosophersand political scientists have been interested in the ethics of warfare (Bellamy 2006 ). An outcome of debates of this long history is aset of principles and arguments that togetherform atheoretical approachwhich is "just war theory." Even thought his theory is not as ystematically argueda pproach,i ti sa ccepted as ac ollection of normative principles regarding warfare (Frowe 2011) . Much of the content of this collection of normative guidelines has also become part of the legally bindingLaw of the Peoples.
This body of theories is also the backgroundf or current debatesi nm oral philosophy.Philosophers of our days are interested in developing awar ethics that fulfills two purposes.T hey argue that moralp hilosophy should expand on and comment the currentL aw of the Peoples.S ome of the most important contributions to this debate, including Walzersfamous book, Just and Unjust War. A Moral Argument with HistoricalIllustrations (Walzer 2006) , has been developed againstthe backdropofthat "legalist paradigm,"which "consistently reflects the conventionso fl aw and order. It does not necessarilyr eflectt he arguments of lawyers, though legal as well as moral debate has its starting point here"(Ibid., 61). In particular,just war theory has focusedonaparadigmatic case of warfare that is framed as amilitary battle among nation states.Even though it is in itself a "crime"(ibid.,21-33), war is regarded as an issue that needs moral assessment, while acts of killing in war especially need to be justified.M oreover, contemporary authors in war ethics also try to highlightnew moral issues that comprise some of the most pressingquestions of our day;namely,how does terrorism need to be addressed in an ethicalf ramework (Coady 2004; G oodin 2006; Scheffler 2006) ?W hich judgments need to be made regarding "new wars" (Münkler 2015) of our times including civil wars,w ars among peoples and genocide?
This contribution takes place at the interface of bothdiscussions.Itrecalls some insights of what is now called "orthodox" or "classic" just war theory as recently explained comprehensivelyi na ni ntroductory work by Helen Frowe( 2011) . In particular,i td iscusses some insights in "jus in bello,"w hich is ap art of the orthodoxwar theory,comprising aset of moralprescriptions when war has already started.Simultaneously,ittries to address anew area of concern in the ethics of war. This is the concern that just war theory has been all too quick in reasoning moral judgments about fatal actions as part of the soldiers mission in war. As military personnel, soldiers are not only allowed to kill soldiers of the belligerent counter-party,t hey are even obliged to do so under circumstancest hat just war theory explains.M oral restrictions do apply to that scenario.B ut they are primarily restricted to principles of a"fair fight."T he jus in bello is the theoretical approach that is dedicatedtolisting and explaining basic principles of restrictions in terms of a"fair fight."T his includesthe protection of civilians, obligations in treatingp risoners of war, prohibitions of some types of weapons,a nd the importantdistinctionbetween legitimate and illegitimate targets (Frowe 2011, 95-117 ). Yet, in this moralframing, too,the obligations to fight in afair way address primarily the commanders,not the single soldier.
Themoral philosopher Jeff McMahan has recentlyinitiated an important shift of attention and systematic change regarding the soldiers moralobligations.He develops at heoretical approach to "killing in war" in the context of ab road ethicaldebate on "killing" (MacMahan 2003) and in the context of just war theory (McMahan 2011) . This approachincludes some challenges for traditional just war theory.I np articular,M cMahani ntroduces ac riteriono f" liability" that transforms the allowances of soldiers in war, even whenfighting ajust war (McMahan 2005) . As ketch of this concept includes the following:p resupposed, as oldier fights awar that needs to be classified as an "unjustwar"; and presupposingthat the soldier himself has contributed to severe war crimes. Thesoldierfighting the just cause nevertheless needs to apply acriterion of liabilitywhen intending to kill another soldier. He needs to assess if he is right to thinkthat the enemysoldierhas forfeited his right to life.Heeven must assess if the enemy is liable to be killed. This is,ofcourse, aparticularly challenging claim.
In this contribution, Iwish to take up the issue of "justified killing in war" in the contexto fr ecent debates in the ethics of war.Ishall start with as ketch of the concept of liability and develop the insights into adirection that McMahan does not focus on. Iwish to argue that the issue of "moralities of warfare" does not only have to include asophisticated approach to culpability and to the permissibility of killing in war.M oreover, to provideafair assessment of the soldiersactions in war, Iwish to present three aspects that contribute to amore thorough assessment of the soldiers actions in war:Ishall argue against ageneral moral exceptionalism regarding the "jus in bello." Instead of bracketing moral claims, basic moral insights need to be applied to the scenario of warfare without claiming ag eneral exception. Ishall then argue two consequences of this claim:adistinction of "just" and "unjust" warfare applyingtosoldiers and amore detailed assessment of moral guilt.
1 This has important effects on the assessment of killing in war by soldiers.
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Yet, two reservations need to be made at the beginning. First, this discussion is restricted to the soldier as military personnel of astate army. Foranalytical clarity, it is necessary to start with this paradigm case of just war theory.Ishall not debate other types of combatants,even though they certainly exist in each war.Second, I shall also interpret the military as part of anational defense institution. This is also far from regular. In my view,war ethicsiswell advised -atleast so when opening new fields of concern -when not starting with the mostcomplex scenariosthat war always includesand presents.Instead, Istart with whathas been considered the "standard case," which is av iolent inter-state conflict, fought by meanso ft he military.
The Framing:Classical Just WarTheory
Since ancient times,authors in political philosophyand in theology have debated the principles that distinguisha"just war" fromother forms of warfare (Bellamy 2006, 15-114) . It is also aparticular traitofjust war theory that has been fed by varioussources.
3 Until today,just war theory also spurs debatesabout the criteria 1T his claim is not new,but has been reasoned by moral philosophers whoare committed to ethical cosmopolitanism. Forawar ethics building on ethical cosmopolitanism, see Fabre 2012 . 2F or our current project on the "moralities of warfare," including the perspectives of soldiers,see the following contributions Schulte-Umberg 2015 and Schulte-Umberg 2017) . 3A very helpful illustration of the sources that have enteredjust war theoryand that have shaped its current content is provided by Bellamy(Bellamy2006, 8) . This book also provides aparticularly comprehensive exploration of the history of just war theory until that support the interpretation of aw ar as meeting the standards of moral allowances.Arange of core principles have entered the Law of the Peoples and has, therefore,also received the status of official doctrines. Themost well-known and possibly mostimportant doctrine is that there is only one convincing just cause, which is national self-defense against am ilitary attack that threatens ap eople both regarding its sovereignty and its territorial integrity (Walzer 2006, 58-63) . Them oral exemption of ag eneral condemnation of wari st he justified battle againstanaggressor.
In discussingthe classical frame of just wartheory,itisalso important to notice that various groupsofmoral principles need to be distinguished. First, principles always apply to acertain phase of war. The"jus ad bellum" discussesexceptional moral allowances and forbearances to go to war or to start aw ar. It discusses military aggression and its counterpart, military defense.T he "jus in bello" instead explores principles once awar has started.Itdevelops principles of fair fight, which have also enteredi nternational law. 4 Recently,t he debate on "jus post bellum"h as also gained momentum,i ncluding an ethicald ebate on reasonable peace settlements after aw ar (Fabre 2016; H olmes 2016) . On the one hand, principles are grouped according to the time-scale distinction "before war," "duringw ar" and "after war."O nt he other hand, types of principles that also transcend this time-scale proposal have been reasoned. Broadly conceived, substantial, procedural, and pragmatic principles need to be distinguished.
Themost important substantialcriterion in jus ad bellumisthe "justcause." If a nationp lans to go to war, it needs to justifyt his endeavori nt he international arena.T oday,t he only permissible just cause is national self-defense after as everely aggressiveattack;yet in the traditionofjust war theory, arange of causes has been accepted, including just punishment or the restoration of peace. As for procedural principles,itis, for example,important to announce the intention to go to war and to meet principles of proportionality.Asfor pragmatic principles,war needs to be alast resort,and there has to be ajustified expectation of reasonable success.
5 None of the criteria is uncontroversial. Yet, as abedrock of war ethics they provideatheoretical frame for further discussion.
It is also important to notice that the fieldofwar ethics is amuch broaderfield than classical just war theory.W ar ethics does not only discuss criteriathat allow for am ilitary conflict and providec onstraintst ow hat is allowed and whati s banned during ac onflict. It also discussesc ivil wars,t errorist attacks, humanitarian intervention and all sorts of "new wars." 6 In particular,going backtothe underlying moral philosophy,t he theoretical framing that has been proposed is multifaceted. It includes more or less classical strands of thought, including a discussion on the righto fs elf-defense as exceptional moral allowance (Lazar 2009; M cMahan1 994; M cMahan 2014; R odin 2002; T homson 1991) . It also includes "absolutist positions" that relyo nt he presumption that killing ap erson shouldn ever be allowed (Nagel 1972 ). Much of current war ethics is also presentedasnot relyingonasingle moral framework,but rather as combining various principles that need to be combined case-by-case and in discussing detailed thought experiments (Kamm2007;2011).
This contribution adds to the ongoing debates in war ethics at ap articular point.I no rder to explain this systematic point of departure,Is hall distinguish three important parameters in war ethics.T he first parameter is related to the time-scale distinctions:m ym ain concern in this contribution is the jus in bello, which is the theoretical aspect of just war theory that debates moral principles in conductingawar. Ia mc oncerned that these principles allow too much:e ven thoughMcMahan and other philosophershave tried to place further restrictions on allowances to kill in war, the paradigm of justifieds elf-defense still overshadows the debate.The second parameter is the focus on the actionsofsoldiers that, in war, have fatal effects on soldiers of the counter-party. Soldiers kill in war. And even thoughthe act of killing has never been accepted as right, soldiers are, for good reasons,exempt from moralcondemnation when killing the enemy. But do the current presumptions regarding reasonable exemptions suffice?The third parameter is an interpretation of "morality"and the goals of amoral investigation in this context. Yet, soldiers also fight awar for their own reasons,a nd some of those function as "moral reasons." Taking the "moralities of warfare" seriously also includesaninvestigationofthat perspective.
Against Moral Exceptionalism of the JusinBello
Just war theory has been interpretedasdistinguishedbycriteria that set one phase of war apart from another phase.The jus ad bellum focuses on the pre-war phase. It argues that arange of criteria needs to be met to regard awar as in accordance both with moral rulesa nd with the Law of the Peoples.Y et this empirical distinction is correlated with normative distinctions,i ncludingj ust causes,p rocedural and pragmatic criteria. As alreadynoted, different principles apply to each phase of war.
6F or an overview over recent issues in just war theory,see (Bellamy2006, 115-228).
As for jus ad bellum and jus in bello aconsensus has evolved sincethe early twentieth centuryt hat takes jus ad bellum and jus in bello as strictly separated. Walzer restates this insight when claiming that war is always judged twice:"[j]us ad bellum requires us to make judgments about aggression and self-defense;jus in bello about the observance or violation of the customary and positive rules of engagement. Thetwo sorts of judgment are logically independent." (Walzer 2006, 21) Accordingtothis approach, which Ishall call the "thesis of separation,"there is no debate about whether or not awar has ajust cause in jus in bello.Instead, the criteria in jus ad bellum and jus in bello are so different that even the following scenario can happen:"[t]hus,ajustifiable war might be waged unjustly;anunjust war may be waged justly." (Bellamy 2006, 128) One of the mostintriguingdebates of current just war theoryfocuses on this distinction betweenjus ad bellum and jus in bello as also including asystematic switch.T he separation of both has ap ragmatic reason; it serves the goal not to overload an ongoing war with am oral reasoning that also includest he condemnation of one of the fighting parties.Itmight even be said that the rationale of the jus in bello rests to somed egree on consequentialist, even pragmatic reasoning:inawar scenarioeverything that counts is the prevention of aworst case scenario.T herefore,n ormative rules need to be established that prevent the biggestevils -possibly agreed upon by both sides. Civiliansneed to be protected from severe harm, particularly harmful weapons causing widespread devastation need to be banned,including chemical weapons,and the use of the militaryneeds to be justified as related to military targets.Agreement among fighting parties can possibly be expected when the reduction of severe harm on bothsides is at stake.
Asecond argument is consequentialist: if the jus in bello included adiscussion on "just" vs." unjust cause," the party on the unjustside would have nothing to lose.A nd in aw ar scenario this is one of the biggeste vils that could happen: persons and parties who are under enormous pressure and in life-threatening scenarios and who have nothing to lose are assumed to act particularly violent. This minimizes the chancesofreaching any peace-settlement in apost-war scenario.
7 It should also be noted that an important cause of continuedwarfare is the fact that each party thinks that they are fighting for ajust cause. This means that really settling the issue as to whether or not war is a"just war" in accordancewith the just-war paradigm is unlikely to happen during war itself.Consequently,the jus in bello has been separated from issues of "just cause." Instead, it focuses on principles of fairness in fighting,which is the only chancetocurtail warfare and to bring war to an end.
Yet, recently,authors in moral philosophy have questioned this reasoning with regard to its normative implications.T heys ay that the exemptiono ft he jus in bello from justificatory moral arguments is not only wrong for theoretical reasons, 7F or more detailed arguments about the necessary limitations of moral argument in jus in bello,see the contributions in (Rodin and Shue 2008). but that it also has anothersevere effect, which cannot be overlooked any more.It leads to an assessment of killing in war that is flawed. There are of course reasons why killing in war is not judgedonapar with murder. Yet, the strict separation between jus ad belluma nd jus in belloh as morally questionable implications: whereas it mightberight to grantsoldiers who fightajust warageneral exemption from being accused of murdering enemy soldiers -note that this does not include war crimes and crimesagainst civilians!-this same reservation does not necessarily apply to soldiers fighting in an unjust war.
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Ishall not discuss the complex issue of whether or not moral allowancesc an ever be reasonedregardingmurderhere.Instead,Ishall focus on the moregeneral claim that the jus in bello needs to be assessed by meansofhighly exceptional moral claims. As afirst step,itishelpfultoreject aradicalform of exceptionalism, which is "realism."Realism claimsthat war is just anotherway of doingpolitics.In arealist paradigm, war is arealm of "necessity and duress" (Walzer 2006, 4-13) . This allows for ag eneral exemption of morals tandards.Y et, most of what has been written in just war theory in the last decades aims at rejecting this general exceptionalism. In some important respects,war also needs to be judged against the backgroundofmoral principles.
As as econd step,i ti sn ecessary to discuss an implication of exceptionalism. This is encapsulated in the doctrineofthe "moral equality of combatants." This doctrine states that the thesis of separation has an important implicationfor the jus in bello.W hen the overall question as to whether or not this war is right is spared from consideration,jus in bello lacks an important ingredient. There is no division between ap arty fighting aj ust war and soldiers who possiblyf ight an unjust war.The orthodox jus in bellostates precisely this;itisdistinct from jus ad bellum in that it does not include judgments over moral rightnesso fe ither the aggressor or those defending themselves againsta ggression;b oth need to be considered in light of ajus in bello that claims fair rules of fighting.
This claim of equality has been explained as the argument of the doctrine of the "moralequality of combatants." However,this doctrine does not only say thatall combatants have an equal set of rights,b ut it also includes,a ccordingt os ome philosophers,anequal right to kill (McMahan 2011, 4) . Actually, Walzer thinks that soldiers should never be blamed for what they do whenparticipating in awar becauset hey endure hell. They have to follow orders.M oreover, he states: "[t]hough there is no license for war-makers,thereislicense for soldiers, and they hold it withoutregard to whichside they are on;itisthe first and mostimportant of theirw ar rights." (Walzer 2006, 36) This is yet another type of moral exceptionalism included in the orthodox jus in bello.
Even though it is grantedt hat the soldiers acts of killing in war need to be assessedi namore complex framework than just identifying it with an act of murderer, moralphilosophersclaim that amore thorough moral assessment than 8F or similar arguments,see (Bellamy2006, 128-130). offered by the classical jus in belloi sn eeded. This also includes an ew debate questioningwhether the distinction between jus ad bellumand jus in bello signals an ormativelyr adical difference.I magine as ituation in which aw ar has been assessed as aperfectly "just war" in that all criteria were met -most importantly, the just cause of self-defense after severe aggression;and simultaneously,this war is extraordinarily brutala nd condemnable,e ven considering that no rules were broken, such as the use of illegal weapons and attackscommitted against civilians. Is it still righttoseparate the jus-in-bello assessment from declaring this war as "unjust"? 9
As aconsequence of the arguments,the field is now open to adebate in war ethics that is particularly complex. Instead of granting the jus in bello moral exceptionalism, moral philosophersh ave developedc riteria for distinguishing between "justified soldiers"and "unjustified soldiers" -broadly conceived.
10 It is not the space here to portray this debate.Ihave the more modest goal of presenting two ways to fill this space in the next section.Ishalldiscuss the distinction between "justifiedsoldiers" and "unjustified soldiers" in war ethics;and Ishall explain why the soldiersown view also needs to be taken into account. Before,the most important insights shall be summarized.
So far, Ih ave defendeda na pproach to jus in bello that breaks with ak ey reservationoforthodox just war theory.According the orthodox view,the moral debateregardingwar has two different functions to fulfill. Thejus ad bellumneeds to develop criteria for judging if military aggressionoramilitary defense is right. Even though war is ac rime,e xemptions from ag eneral moral forbearance of waging war have been argued.T he jus in bello,i nstead, develops criteria for fighting war by fair means. It argues that moral constraints need to be restricted to rules of fairness, including, among others,the rulesofproportionalityand likely success,the protection of civilians,the strict forbearance of particularly harmful weaponry,a nd the care for prisoners of war (Frowe 2011, 95-117) .Ihave also arguedthat the thesis of separation that lurks in the backgroundisflawed. Even thoughthe concerns of fairness in war are still of utmost importance,they do not cover the whole set of moral concerns regardingw arfare.A taminimum, the allowancetokill the enemy needs to be reassessed again and again, and in particular, against the backdrop of different types of warfare and of new technologies as well.
9F or adiscussion of this casewhich also coheres with opinionsinthe tradition of just war theory,see (Bellamy2006, 128-130) . 10 An overview aboutm ost important contributions to this debate is presented in (Rodin and Shue2008) .
The Debate on Justified and Unjustified Soldiers
When fighting aw ar, soldiers are placed in as ituation of exceptional circumstances. Thesentence that, in this context, usually makes sense is the following: "War is hell."Whereas the orthodox just war theoryoffered asimpleformula for exculpatingsoldiers by granting an equal right to kill the enemy,recent war ethics denies this right. This does not say that killing in war is judged on the samegrounds as killing during peace.This would be highly unfair. Instead, war ethics has tried to establish criteria not only for weighingt he moralf ault of soldiers when killing soldiers of the hostile military,b ut also criteria for reassessing the right to kill itself.
Starting with the latter, the leadingparadigminjudging killing in war usedtobe "self-defense." Let us assume that aw ar is clearly an unjust war. It is military aggression that lacks ajust causeand in addition it might lack further qualifying criteria, such as proportionality or last resort.One might argue that soldiers who fight this war cannot be judged as doingthe rightthing whenkilling in war. Even worse,they cannot be excused from killing in war. This seems rather harsh and needs to be qualified. Philosophers have tried to add some qualifications.
Them ost important one is related to the category of "liability." McMahan explains that it is wrong to conceive of killing in war,even when done by soldiers, as permissible by the "righttokill."Instead, he explainsthat amoralexploration needs to focus on the person who will be killed. Thebasic question is notwhether or not it is allowed to take the life of this person, but whether or not she is either a legitimate target or an "innocent" victim (McMahan 2011, 8) . As for soldiers,they have,inaway,lost their status of innocence, in particular whenfightinganunjust war. Yet, the first philosophical point is:"[t]o attack someone who is liable to be attacked is neither to violatenor to infringe that personsright, for the persons being liable to attack just is his having forfeited his right not to be attacked, in the circumstances." (McMahan 2011, 10) This qualification is controversial. Yet, regardingamoral assessment of killing in war,i ti sp articularly helpful:i nan ormativeperspective it divides the acts of killing not only into acts that are allowed vs.acts that are never allowed, but it alsohelps to assess the special situation on the battlefield. It helps to distinguish between necessary and unjust threats in war.In McMahanswords:"Ihave suggested that the criterionofliability to attack in war is moral responsibility for an objectively unjustified or wrongful threat. Thenotion of awrongful threat is,however, ambiguous.Inits primary sense,awrongful threatisathreatofwrongful harm -that is,harm to which the victim is not liableposed by action that is objectively wrong. In most instances in which unjust combatants attack just combatants they pose awrongful threat in this sense.Y et when just combatants attack unjustcombatants withint he limits of proportionality,they neither act wrongly nor wrong their victims." (McMahan2011, 38) This proposal is highly controversial. But in one respect, it is in line with recent debateonkilling eitherinself-defense or as part of acollective endeavor of ajust war. Thenormative implicationofkilling on the battlefield is an offense against the right of the enemy soldier -healso has aright to live.But no-one can really take awayaright to live.Instead, what matters on moralgrounds is whether or not it is ever allowed to kill, even when the judgmentisright that by providing herself alethal threat to another person, she has forfeited her right to integrity of life and body (Rodin 2002) . Whereas some justify this with reference to a"highergoal," the proposal of McMahan and others points in another direction. It speaks about the willful forfeiture of arighttolive by joiningamilitary that fights an unjust war and by committing crimes in war.
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Thed ebate on justifiable killing in war does not end here;a ctuallyi ts tarts precisely at this point. In particular,i ti sn ot comprehensively attached to the distinction of soldiersfightingawar that qualifies as "just war" accordingtothe principles of just war theory or fighting an unjust war respectively.Areal matter of concern is also the distinction between exceptional moral permissibility and justified excuses (McMahan2011, 110-115) . It is possible to judge an act as morally wrong, yet nevertheless under specified circumstances as morally permissible.Itis also possible to judge an act as morally flawed, yet excusable.Whereas the former makes it difficult to arguejustifiable acts of killing, 12 the latterposes no particular difficulties when arguingf or soldiers who fulfill their duty on the battlefield. Excuses include the duress that soldierss uffer on the battlefield and epistemic limitations in assessing the situation on the battlefield (Shue 2008, 99 ). Yet, they do not contributetochanging the deontic parameters that apply to an act:killing is still wrong.Anadditional criterionfor excuses -even though applied to morally wrong acts-is lack-of-controlc onditions.S oldiers do not only encounter difficultiestryingtounderstandwhat is going on in their surroundings,they also have no influence on the overall cause of events,which is decided by the army or the regime, but not by themselves (Fabre 2012, 75-78) .
In addition to these proposals for amore detailed assessment of killing in war, Kutz (2005) argues that, even after decades of debate on liability and its consequences,asomehow basic version of the "equality of combatants" thesis is still in place.Under so-called "collectivist approaches to war,"amain concern is that it is not appropriate to distinguishsharplybetween the acts of soldiers, on the one side,and war as acollectivist enterprise undertaken by states and commanded by military leaders on the other. Kutz notes that "the fact that my nation is atwar,not me,does not absolvemeofresponsibilitytowards my enemy,but it does create a normativelyd istinct relation betweenu s, one structured through as et of rules specific to our interrelationship as individual members of warring nations." (Kutz 2005, 173) Theencounters between soldiersare also shaped by rules of apolitically collectiveevent. Nevertheless,does the distinction between individual moral permissionsa nd collective moral permissions apply?I np articular:" [t]he privilege to kill as part of ac ollective is not am oralp ermission attaching to the individual soldier." (Ibid.) Yet, the difference between thesetypes of permissions is not amoralone;instead, it is explained with reference to the collective of which the soldiers are ap art. In ac ollective that follows rules of authorizationa nd obedience,members of that collectiveare supposed to authorize each other to use violence for political means.
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To sum up this section, it is important to discuss the moral status of soldiers anew.Y et, abroadlyconceived distinction between "just soldiers"fighting ajust war and "unjust soldiers" being involved in an unjust war is not convincing. Even though it is righttoreintroduce the criteriaof"just and unjust war" into the jus in bello,t he soldierss tance does not comprehensively depend on this distinction. Some proposals to fulfill the aim of amore detailedapproach to killing in war have been presented. They include areassessmentofapresumptively general "right to kill,"t he debates urrounding the category of "liability" in terms of the risk of being killedonthe battlefield due to asignificant moral fault, and arejection of the full burdensofresponsibility because of fair excuses.Atleast when fighting a just war, soldiers also perform an honorable duty.And even in unjust wars,soldiers are not free to judge and to act, but act under duress,under severe epistemic limitations and without full control of their actions.They are part of acollective that follows rules,inparticular, the rule of obedience.
And the Soldiers Own Viewpoint?
Even though this contributiona lreadyc overs ar ange of issues of the moral concerns regarding the soldiersstanceinwar, there is still another severe limitation of orthodox just war theory that needs to be addressed. Soldiers are actors who are obliged to follow the commands in the military.Y et, their viewpoints do not count. Soldiers are regarded as military personnel;they have the duty to obey the commands of military leaders.Inawar of self-defense of anationthey are also agents who dedicatemore than their work powertothe honorable cause of defendingt he nation. This includesf atal actiona nd the use of lethal weaponry. Depending on his education as as oldier,s he is in some armies taught to reject orders that do not cohere with moralp rinciples in fundamental ways.B ut the motives that count for her are neitheramatter of decision,nor does he choosea personal approach to the justice of the goal that he fights to accomplish together with his comrades.O verall, soldiers live in ad ifferent world than the civil everyday world. And they have made promises that they need to live up to.Insum, soldiers are in an exceptional situation. But orthodox just war theory has not given attention to this exceptionalism, either.
Recently,this blind spot of orthodox war ethics has been criticized. How could the justice of warfaree ver be assessed in af air manner, without also drawing attention to the commitment of single soldiers in fighting awar?T oinitiate this discussion Iw ish to refer to observations that have been reported by Nancy Sherman (Sherman 2010 ). Sherman exploresp ersonal assessmentso ff ormer soldiersinthe UnitedStates,especially the views of veterans.This includesreports of her father, who,atthe time of her study, was aveteranofWWII. Overall, she claims that to overcome war trauma it is particularly important for veteranst o regard their own fight as part of an endeavor that was a"just war" or at least a particularly worthwhile enterprise at that time.Inthis light,Sherman comments on the reports of her father, acommander during WWII:"[i]n his case,hedoes have time to reflect, and wonders if the fight is worth the horrific ruin and devastation he anticipatesand then sees up close in dying men and mutilatedbodies. That sense of his own responsibilityfor the specific war he fights is there,whether he talks about it openly or not. Theworry is about proportionality,the ratio of the good anticipated to all the carnage. Is it worth it?Inthe war he fought, he believes it was, then and now,a sm ost do.B ut the point Ia mm aking is that the moral oversight is internal. Yes, it is not just about whathedid as an individual soldier, in his case,administering inoculations and relief to the war-torn and maimed. It is also about the war he was in. That frames his perspective and his responsibility." (Ibid., 46) Thereport of Sherman and her interviews with war veterans open anew range of difficult issues.The question of whether or not the war was worth the soldiers commitment and whether or not it was a" just war" appears to matter to the soldier himself.S herman discusses the situation of veterans. They are in the comfortable and simultaneously difficult situation to draw conclusions about wars that area tl eastf or themselves over. Yet, some more general preliminaryc onclusions can be presented. First, the discussion of the soldiers own interpretations and views of warfare contributes to the proposal of Kutz (Kutz 2005) . Soldiers interpret their acts in the context of commitments not only to the military,but also to the joint commitment of comrades fighting together (Kallhoff and SchulteUmberg 2015, 447) . One cornerstone for understandingthis complex relationship is an interpretation and exploration of what we call the "morality of warfare." Soldiers neither reason about the moral principles that guide their actions,nor do they simply share worldviews and insights that they have learned and acquired in varioussocial surroundings.Instead, they share norms of acollective that works with ac omplex pattern of moral norms, including also the norms of religious worldviews.
14 In particular,s oldiers try to frame their actionsi nw ays that represent reasonable goals and core commitments accordingt ot heir moral worldviews.Even though thesefacts do not account for exculpation,they are important 14 Fora ne xplorationo ft he religiousa spects of war morale in WWI, see the contribution of T. Schulte-Umberg in this volume.
in addressing the exceptionalism of orthodox just war theory from ad ifferent angle.Soldiers need to be taken seriously in their worldviews,too.
Conclusion
Overall, the "morality" that has been explored in thecontext of orthodox just war theory is far too restricted. It has many blindspots,includingthe ones enumerated in this contribution.I tf alls shorto fa ddressing "killing in war" in an adequate framework.Moreover, the assessment of killing in war is often too one-sided. It offers little help in discussingt he distinctions between killing in just and unjust wars likewise.Inthis contribution, Ihave tried to remedy this problem by arguing that the moral exceptionalism of jus in bello should be rejected.
Thesteps that have been argued coherewith recent debatesinthedomain of moral philosophy. Authors generally begin by rejecting the doctrine of the "moral equality of combatants" and its background-assumption. In orthodox just war theory,the theorythat debates whether or not the beginningofwar is right -the jus ad bellum -has been logically separated from jus in bello.Inaddition, jus in bello has been restricted to principles of afair fight. One of the major mishaps in that theory is that it appearstopropose either ageneral allowance of soldiers to kill other soldiers or am oral assessment that does not drawo nd etailed moral distinctions.
Afirst proposal to heal this deficit is the rejection of the moral-equality thesis. Moral philosophers argue that the difference between ajust and an unjust war also needs to bear somehowonthe moral status of soldiers.Insectiontwo,Ihave also questioned an all too broad distinction along these lines.Arguments that support this view highlight duress,epistemic limitations and lack of control. In addition, the case needs to be made for war as ac ollective enterprise.E ven though collectivity is not the backdrop for ageneral exculpation, the duties of soldiers in war and their commitment to fulfilling military goals need to be takenseriously.Inthe last section, Ih ave argued that this insight also leads into another direction: soldiers are not only committed to fulfilling their duty,but they also participate in and shape ac ollective approacht oa"morality of warfare"o ft heir own. Even though this does not necessarily bear on morala llowanceso rf orbearances,a n exploration of this type of moralityo fw arfare is obligatory to do justice to the soldiersstance.
